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Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkifli
The Supreme Court's Assault on Private
Ownership of Property
.. .nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.'
I. Introduction and Scope
The concluding phrase of the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution establishes two distinct constitutional limitations
2
on the power of government a to divest individuals of their property.
4
First, government may expropriate property only for a "public use.
' '
1
Second, the responsible government entity must give just compensa-
tion to the aggrieved owner in exchange for causing the deprivation
of his property. 6 Heedless of this two-fold limitation, the United
I. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See H. BLACK, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 349-72 (1895) (the language of
the fifth amendment places both public use and just compensation restrictions on a sovereign's
ability to expropriate private property); J. GELIN & D. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 9-20 (1982) (explains the nature of the fifth amendment's public use and just
compensation restrictions on the authority of a sovereign to expropriate private property); Mei-
dinger, The Public Uses of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3 (1980)
(describes the constitutional public use and just compensation limitations on a sovereign's abil-
ity to expropriate private property) [hereinafter cited as Meidinger]. Accord, T. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647-704 (5th ed. 1883) (delineates limitations
imposed by various state constitutions on government's ability to expropriate private property).
3. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) for the first
time applied the fifth amendment's private property protections against state government
through the fourteenth amendment.
4. Both real and personal property are subject to expropriation by a sovereign. See I
P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 3.2 (J. Sackman 3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as P. NICHOLS]. This comment focuses on government expropriation of real property, but
the discussion applies to government expropriation of both types of property.
5. For a discussion of the traditional judicial conception of the public use requirement,
see Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615
(1940) [hereinafter cited as Nichols, Public Use]. See also Note, The Public Use Limitation
on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L. J. 599 (1949) (analyzes the beginning
of a judicial trend away from substantive enforcement of the public use limitation) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Advance Requiem].
6. In United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943), the Court held that "[an
owner of lands sought to be condemned is entitled to their fair market value fairly deter-
mined." See also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943) (notes just compensation
means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken).
For an overview of the fifth amendment's just compensation limitation on a sovereign's
ability to expropriate private property, see generally Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking
States Supreme Court, through a series of decisions' culminating in
May 1984 with Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,8 has gradu-
ally eroded to the point of extinction the so-called "public use" re-
quirement.' The unanimous Midkiff court, in a strongly-worded
opinion by Justice O'Connor, upheld the constitutionality of Ha-
waii's Land Reform Act of 1967,10 which created a land condemna-
tion scheme providing for the compelled transfer of fee simple title in
real property from certain lessors to their lessees in exchange for the
fair market value of the property. The legislature intended this
scheme to reduce the high concentration of land ownership in the
hands of a few individuals."
The rationale of Midkiff, and of preceding decisions derives
from the Court's insistence on complete deference to legislative de-
terminations of what constitutes a public use."3 The Court places
questions concerning the public uses for which government may ap-
propriate private property outside the scope of judicial review.13 As a
consequence, state and federal legislatures have almost complete dis-
cretion in decisions concerning exercise of the eminent domain
power. 14 The Court now considers a simple legislative classification
of a property use as "public" sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
public use restriction.' 5
After a brief background discussion of both the eminent domain
power and its public use limitation, this comment analyzes Midkiff
and its predecessors in an effort to discern the development of the
Supreme Court's controversial interpretation of the public use re-
quirement. The comment posits that the Court's present interpreta-
tion of the fifth amendment fails to protect the right to property as
expounded by the drafters of the Bill of Rights.' It concludes that
the failure has upset a constitutional balance between the govern-
ment's authority to expropriate private property and the individual's
Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165 (1974); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne, Taking or
Damaging by Police Power. The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1971).
7. See infra notes 57-108 and accompanying text.
8. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
9. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
10. HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 516 (1977).
1I. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2325.
12. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
arising from this situation.
15. See infra notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
16. The Bill of Rights consists of the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
For a general overview of their history, see E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY (1957) [hereinafter cited as E. DUMBAULD].
right to secure ownership of property.
II. Background
A. Eminent Domain
The term "eminent domain"' 7 is traditionally employed in both
judicial opinions18 and legal commentary' 9 to describe the power of a
sovereign to expropriate private property without the owner's consent
for ,purposes the sovereign deems necessary to promote the general
welfare.20 The eminent domain power, which is generally considered
an inherent and essential attribute of sovereignty,21 takes priority
over the property rights of individuals within the sovereign's jurisdic-
tion, unless specific restrictions, such as the public use and just com-
pensation limitations, restrict its exertion. 2 In the Anglo-American
tradition, the power is thought to lie dormant until activated by a
17. The term "eminent domain" was first used to describe a sovereign's ability to ex-
propriate private property in H. GROTIus, DE GURE BELLI ET PACKS 20 (1625), reprinted in P.
NICHOLS, supra note 4, at § 1.12[1].
the property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the state, so that the
state or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property,
not only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a
right over the property of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends
those who founded civil society must be supposed to have intended that private
ends should give way.
See also Marquis, Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Condemn, 43 IowA L. REV. 170,
171-72 (1958) (the term "eminent domain" is not found in the U.S. Constitution, but its
presence can be implied from the fifth amendment's clause concerning a sovereign's authority
to expropriate private property).
18. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Louis. & Nash. R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 400 (1912) (emi-
nent domain power of a sovereign is the authority to expropriate private property); Boom v.
Patterson, 8 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (each state has the authority to exercise the eminent do-
main power for the expropriation of private property).
19. See, e.g., J. ROSE, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAND USE PLANNING 210-11 (1974)
(the term "eminent domain" is traditionally used to describe the power of a sovereign to ex-
propriate private property) [hereinafter cited as J. ROSE]; Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Do-
main - Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 597-98 (1954) (eminent domain is the
term used to describe the power of a sovereign to expropriate private property that is men-
tioned in the fifth amendment).
20. For an overview of the eminent domain power and its various characteristics, see J.
LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3rd ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as J.
LEWIS]. See also J. RosE, supra note 19 at 210-45 (describes the administrative procedures
necessary to implement the eminent domain power).
21. "The power to take private property for public use, generally termed the right of
eminent domain, belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of sovereignty,
and requires no constitutional recognition." United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883).
See also People v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 117 N.Y. 150, 155, 22 N.E. 1026, 1027 (1889) (an
eminent domain over all the property in the state is an incident of sovereignty); Sackman, The
Right to Condemn, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 177, 178-79 (1965) (distinguishes the eminent domain
power from the police and taxation powers, which are other attributes of sovereignty) [herein-
after cited as Sackman].
22. See Jones, 109 U.S. at 518 (the provision found in the federal constitution dealing
with the eminent domain power is merely a limitation on the power). Accord Note, State
Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1964)
(analyzes the actions of different state courts in applying and enforcing state constitutional
limitations on the eminent domain power) [hereinafter cited as Note, State Limitations].
specific legislative enactment.2 3 Despite the relatively recent origin of
the term "eminent domain" exercise of the power dates back to Ro-
man, and perhaps even Biblical, times. 4
B. The Public Use Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power
The public use limitation on eminent domain is found in the
case law and constitutions of most states, as well as the federal con-
stitution.25 Legislative determination of what property uses are "pub-
23. "The fundamental power to exercise the right to acquire property by eminent do-
main lies dormant in the state until the legislature by specific enactment delineates the occa-
sion, procedures and agencies by which it may be placed in operation." Housing Authority of
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Langley, 555 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Okla. 1976). See also Colo-
nial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 505, 251 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1979) (the authority to
exercise the eminent domain power must be conferred by statute); 5A G. THOMPSON, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2576 (J. Grimes 5th ed. 1978) (the
power of eminent domain lies dormant in a sovereign until specific legislative enactment autho-
rizes its use).
A legislature, by specific statutory authorization, may confer the authority to exercise the
eminent domain power on a private individual or entity if the intended use of the property will
benefit the public. See I P. NICHOLS, supra note 4 at §§ 3.21-3.3. See also H. MILLS, A
TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 79-85 (1879) (describes various legislative
delegations of the eminent domain power to private corporations and other entities) [hereinaf-
ter cited as H. MILLS]; Note, "Public Use" as a Limitation on the Exercise of the Eminent
Domain Power by Private Entities, 50 IOWA L. REV. 799 (1965) (analyzes the potential con-
flicts between the public use limitation and private exercise of the eminent domain power).
24. Puffendorf, Bynkershoek, Grotius and Vattel were European civil law jurists who,
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wrote about the nature of the sovereign au-
thority to expropriate private property. See I P. NICHOLS, supra note 4 at § 1.21[1]. See also
Meidinger, supra note 2 at 5-6 (describes the works of various civil law jurists concerning the
eminent domain power); Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV.
553, 583-85 (1972) (delineates the philosophical conflicts between the civil law writers over the
exact nature of the eminent domain power) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck].
The Romans used compulsory transfer of property from private individuals to the sover-
eign to foster the building of aqueducts and roads, both of which are found throughout the
territory that was once the Roman Empire. The exact nature of the authority or procedures
used by the Romans, however, remains obscured by the passage of time. See Stoebuck, supra
at 553-54. See also Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L.Q. REV. 512, 521 (1929) (the
existence of aqueducts and roads crisscrossing the Roman Empire in straight lines is prima
facie evidence that Rome employed procedures for expropriating the private property of its
citizens); Pound, The Valuation of Property in Roman Law, 34 HARV. L. REV. 227, 252-56
(1 921 ) (theorizes on the procedures employed by the Roman government to value property for
the purpose of compensation when an individual's property was seized).
King Ahab's seizure of Naboth's vineyards, recorded I Kings 21, is considered by some to
be the first recorded exercise of the eminent domain power by a sovereign. See I P. NICHOLS,
supra note 4 at § 1.2. But see Stoebuck, supra note 24 at 553 (Ahab's murder of Naboth
indicates that the King did not have the lawful authority to seize the vineyards).
For a general overview of the history of the eminent domain power, see I P. NICHOLS,
supra note 4 at §§ 1.2-1.24. See also Meidinger, supra note 2 at 4-37 (concise history of the
development of the eminent domain power from Roman times to the modern era); Stoebuck,
supra note 24 at 554-66 (a thorough description of the history of the eminent domain power in
England and early colonial times).
25. See 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 4 at § 7.01 (surveys the development of the public
use limitation in the case law of the states); id. at § 1.3 (fifth amendment's eminent domain
clause, although differently worded, appears in the constitution of every state except North
Carolina). See also Note, State Limitations, supra note 22 at 721-25 (analyzes the considera-
tions influencing state courts when they are confronted with questions concerning whether a
particular use of property justifies the sovereign's expropriation of private property).
lic," though given considerable weight,"6 traditionally faced judicial
review17 on the ground that the courts have ultimate authority to
interpret the meaning of constitutional terms and provisions.28
Confronted with questions concerning the breadth of public use
limitations on the eminent domain power, courts generally have
adopted one of two interpretations. 29 The first interpretation involves
an extremely strict "use by the public" test, which requires that ei-
ther the general public or the government actually use the expropri-
ated property.30 The second interpretation involves a broader "public
benefit" test, which requires only that the general public, or some
26. In United States v. Gettysburg E. Ry., 160 U.S. 680, 682 (1896), the Court stated
that "[w] here the legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment
will be respected by the courts, unless the use is palpably without reasonable foundation." But
cf. Calcasieu & S. Ry. Co. v. Bel, 224 Ga. 269, 273, 69 So. 2d 40, 41 (1953) (determination
of public use questions is a strictly judicial function).
27. See infra notes 55 and 161.
28. The authority of the judiciary to act as the final interpreter in questions concerning
the meaning of the United States Constitution was firmly established by Justice Marshall's
opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803): "It is emphatically the
province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." See also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (it is the duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (it is the responsibility of
the Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962) (the Court has the responsibility of being the ultimate interpreter of the Constitu-
tion); Cooper v. Aaron, 385 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958) (the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law by the Constitution, and this principle is respected by both the Court and
the country as a permanent and indispensible feature of our constitutional system).
The principle that the judiciary will act as the final authority on the meaning of the
Constitution is also enunciated in THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter
ed. 1961):
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an interme-
diate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other things,
to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation
of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in
fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particu-
lar act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation
and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitu-
tion ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the inten-
tion of their agents.
29. For a discussion and analysis of the two interpretations, see 2A P. NICHOLS, supra
note 4 at § 7.02. See also Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L.
REv. 203, 204-5 (1978) (an analysis of judicial use of the two interpretations to expand the
public use requirement to encompass new, emerging property uses) [hereinafter cited as
Berger].
30. In Shasta Power Co. v. Walker, 149 F. 568, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1906), for example,
the court noted that
[ilt is not sufficient that the contemplated improvement will operate as a benefit
to the community, or the people or property holders thereof, by increasing prop-
erty valuations, or affording facilities for availing themselves of the service that
the corporation proposes to supply or afford; for this is altogether foreign to the
idea. But the service proposed must be such as every individual member of the
community, similarly situated, shall have the right to demand and receive upon
like conditions as any other member.
See also Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 59, 64 (N.Y. 1837) (the general public
must have a right to enjoy the property taken).
segment of it, receive some benefit from the appropriated property."1
The second interpretation does not require actual use of the property
by the general public. 32 Rather, a private individual or entity may
have the exclusive right to use the expropriated property if the court
concludes that the intended use will benefit the public. This broad
"public benefit" interpretation of the public use requirement has
gradually achieved almost universal recognition by both federal and
state courts88 because it allows incorporation into the public use con-
cept of society's continually evolving notion of what constitutes a
public benefit.
34
Despite the expanding variety of property uses accepted as
"public" by the courts,3 5 the rapid economic development exper-
ienced during the nineteenth century sparked considerable judicial
controversy over the exact nature of the public use requirement.3 6
State exercise of the eminent domain power to acquire property for
31. "It is not essential that the entire community, nor even a considerable portion,
should directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order to constitute a public use."
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923). One commentator has noted that
[iut is not essential that the whole community, or any considerable portion
thereof, should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement, to make the use
public. If the proposed improvement tends to enlarge the resources, increase the
industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable num-
ber in the community, the use is public.
H. MILLS, supra note 23 at 15. See also Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 289
P.2d I, 6 (1955) (a public use is any property use that promotes the general welfare of the
community).
32. In Blakely v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 601, 313 N.E.2d 903, 909 (1974), for example,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that construction of a large hotel complex
would benefit the public welfare. Consequently, property could be condemned pursuant to state
authority to facilitate the construction. No actual use of the premises by the general public
was required. The court believed that the effects of the construction, such as the increased
marketability of the land and the improved tax base of the community, justified state exercise
of the eminent domain power.
33. See Meidinger, supra note 2 at 38-42. Meidinger notes that judicial acceptance of
the public benefit interpretation of the public use limitation has vastly increased the number of
property uses accepted as public in nature by courts. Indeed, the author speculates that the
public benefit interpretation is broad enough to encompass almost any expropriation by a sov-
ereign or its agents. Id. at 42.
34. But see Phillips v. Foster, 215 Va. 543, 211 S.E.2d 93 (1975). The court noted that
"[t]he salient consideration is not whether a public benefit results, but whether a public use is
predominant." Id. at 547, 211 S.E.2d at 96.
35. See Berger, supra note 29 at 204-25 (an overview of the gradual expansion of the
types of uses courts have considered public in nature); Note, Rex Non Protest Peccare??? The
Decline and Fall of the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 76 DICK. L. REV. 266,
267-75 (1972) (examines the two interpretations of the public use limitation and charts the
emergence of the public purpose or benefit interpretation as the one generally utilized by
courts). Cf. Note, Real Property - Eminent Domain - Expansion of the Public Use Doc-
trine to Include the Alleviation of Unemployment and Revitalization of the Economic Base of
a Community, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1975, 1978-83 (1982) (describes problems confronted by
courts attempting to determine when a newly emerging use of property by a private entity is
intended primarily to benefit the public).
36. M. Horwitz, The Transformation of the Conception of Property in American Law
1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 249-51 (1973) (people placed less importance on their
property rights because of the Industrial Revolution and the concomitant economic expansion)
[hereinafter cited as Horwitz].
use by private entities presented courts with questions regarding the
extent of the limitation."a The initial judicial reaction was mixed.
Some courts opted for a narrow interpretation; 38 others adopted a
broader approach. 9 The latter view eventually prevailed.40
Endeavoring to aid the country's economic expansion, many
courts began upholding the constitutionality of attempts in several
states to expropriate property for use by private interests, especially
railroad4'1 and mining concerns, 2 on the theory that private use of
the property would benefit the public by improving the nation's econ-
omy.4 3 This led to the adoption of the "public benefit" rationale to
37. See Nichols, Public Use, supra note 5 at 617-24. See also Bennet, Eminent Do-
main and Redevelopment: The Return of Engine Charlie, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 115, 116-22
(1981) (categorizes the types of private property uses for which states exercise their eminent
domain power) [hereinafter cited as Bennet].
38. See, e.g., Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 333 (1859) (expropriation of private
property with the intent of establishing a privately owned grist mill is not permitted). Accord,
Nichols, Public Use, supra note 5 at 617-18 (use by the public interpretation emerged in some
court opinions as a reaction to the states' increasing boldness in expropriating private property
for a variety of private users).
39. In Hazen v. Essex Co., 66 Mass (12 Cush.) 475, 478 (1853), for example, the court
stated that
[tlhe establishment of a great mill-power for manufacturing purposes, as an ob-
ject of great public interest, especially since manufacturing has come to be one
of the great public industrial pursuits of the commonwealth, seems to have been
regarded by the legislature and sanctioned by the jurisprudence of the common-
wealth, and, in our judgment, rightly so, in determining what is a public use,
justifying the exercise of the right to eminent domain.
See also 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 4 at § 7.02[2](survey of nineteenth century court deci-
sions that adopted the public benefit interpretation of the public use limitation to facilitate the
nation's economic growth).
40. See Note, Eminent Domain - The Meaning of the Term "Public Use" - Its
Effect on Excess Condemnation, 18 MERCER L. REV. 274 (1966). The author observes that
[alt one time this narrow construction ["use by the public" test] of the phrase
public use was adhered to by the majority of the state courts but in recent years
the courts throughout the United States have displayed a liberalizing trend in all
facets of the law of eminent domain and as a result the traditional "public use"
meaning has been radically transformed. Consequently, there has emerged a
much broader interpretation aimed at protecting public rights at the peril of
property rights being severely restricted. This liberal approach has taken on new
perspective by shifting the criteria from that of "use by the public" to "advan-
tage to the public."
Id. at 275. See also supra note 33.
41. See, e.g., Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 42, (1852) (legislative exercise of eminent
domain power to obtain private property for railroad construction by a private rail corporation
is proper). For a discussion concerning legislative exercise of the eminent domain power to
promote private construction of railroads, see 2A P. NIcHoLs, supra note 4 at §§ 7.51-7.53.
42. See, e.g., Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, II Nev. 394 (1876). In upholding the
state's expropriation of property for use by private mining concerns, the court noted that
"[t]he present prosperity of the state is entirely due to the mining developments already made,
and the entire people of the state are directly interested in having future developments unob-
structed by the obstinate action of any individual or individuals." Id. at 409-10. See also
Nichols, Public Use, supra note 5 at 623-24 (discusses the importance of mining to the eco-
nomic prosperity of many western states during the nineteenth century).
43. "Overall, the courts expanded the use of eminent domain in the nineteenth century
to serve the needs of the newly-emerging industrial elite." Bennett, supra note 37 at 118. See
also Horowitz, supra note 36 at 270-78 (Americans are generally willing to sacrifice their
rights to own private property for the sake of promoting economic expansion).
justify legislative exercise"" of eminent domain power for a variety of
uses that were not "public" in the traditional sense.45 The most nota-
ble example of these newly emerging public uses is the urban re-
newal project,"6 in which state or federal condemnation authority is
utilized to transfer property to a private developer for redevelopment
purposes.'
III. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Public Use
Limitation
A. Overview
Questions concerning the meaning of the public use clause of
the fifth amendment first reached the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth century.'8 Two attitudes have dominated throughout the
history of the Court's public use decisions. First, the Court has con-
sistently applied a broad "public benefit" interpretation. 9 Second,
44. See supra note 23.
45. For a thorough discussion of the different types of property uses that courts have
designated as public in nature, see generally 1. LEVY, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A. 203-15
(1969); 2A P. NICHOLS, supra note 4 at §§ 7.20-7.60; Bennett, supra note 49 at 122-28.
46. See, e.g., New York Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153
(1936). In upholding the legislature's expropriation of private property for redevelopment by a
private contractor, the New York Court of Appeals noted that
[i]n a matter of far-reaching public concern, the public is seeking to take the
defendant's property and administer it as part of a project conceived and to be
carried out in its own public interest and for its own protection. That is a public
benefit, and, therefore, at least as far as this case is concerned, a public use.
Id. at 343, 1 N.E.2d at 156. See also Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464, 476 (Wash.
1963) (appendix to decision provides an alphabetical index of state court decisions that have
approved state exercise of the eminent domain power to aid urban renewal projects).
47. Meidinger, supra note 2 at 33-37 provides a general overview of the interrelation-
ship between the public use limitation and urban renewal projects.
48. The Supreme Court did not formally recognize the federal government's authority
to exercise the eminent domain power until its decision in Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367
(1875). The fifth amendment's limitations on the eminent domain power were not extended to
the states by the Court until its 1897 decision in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Consequently, federal courts were not confronted with many
eminent domain questions until the end of the nineteenth century. Prior to this, state courts
provided the primary forum for questions concerning the eminent domain power. See Note,
Advance Requiem, supra note 5 at 599-600.
49. In Fallbook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159-60 (1896), for example,
the Court noted that "[lit is obvious ... that what is a public use frequently and largely
depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular subject-matter in regard
to which the character of the use is questioned."
The Court elaborated on this expansive view of the public purpose limitation in Mt.
Vernon Cotton Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916). In addressing the
problems surrounding the ascertainment of a public use, the Court noted that
[iln the organic relations of modern society it may sometimes be hard to draw
the line that is supposed to limit the authority of the legislature to exercise or
delegate the power of eminent domain. But to gather the streams from waste
and draw from them energy, labor without brains, and so to save mankind from
toil it can be spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is the very foundation of
all our achievements and all our welfare. If that purpose is not public we should
be at a loss to say what is.
See also Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905) (the determination of what is a public use
the language in a number of the Court's decisions has signaled the
growth of a deferential, even obsequious, posture toward both state
and federal legislative public use determinations.5" The next section
begins with a discussion of the decisions leading up to the Supreme
Court's present interpretation of the public use limitation.
B. Early Supreme Court Decisions Concerning the Public Use
Limitation
The initial decisions on the public use question evidence the Su-
preme Court's adoption of the "public benefit" interpretation of the
public use clause. 51 In Mt. Vernon Cotton Co. v. Alabama Interstate
Power Co.,52 the Court specifically repudiated the "use by the pub-
lic" test, reasoning that the stricter view would not allow courts the
flexibility to adapt public use standards to society's changing val-
ues. 53 Nonetheless, legislative public use determinations, though enti-
tled to a presumption of constitutionality,"4 were still considered sub-
ject to judicial review. 55 The broader "societal benefit" interpretation
simply provided legislatures with more discretion in choosing when
to exercise the eminent domain power for the purpose of furthering
the general welfare. 56 The courts had not abdicated entirely in favor
of the legislatures.
C. Retreat from Judicial Review of Legislative Public Use
Determinations
1. Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States.-The Supreme
Court's retreat from judicial review of legislative public use determi-
nations began with Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States.57 In
Old Dominion, the court considered whether federal condemnation
of privately owned land containing government military structures
often depends on the particular facts or circumstances surrounding a particular situation).
50. See infra notes 66-108 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 49.
52. 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
53. "The inadequacy of the use by the public test as a universal test is established." Id.
54. In Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921), the Court noted that "a declaration
by a legislature concerning public conditions that by necessity and duty it must know, is enti-
tled at least to great respect." See also supra note 26.
55. "The nature of a use, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial question."
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 705 (1923). See also Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S.
439, 446 (1930) (public use questions are judicial ones); Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U.S. 242,
251 (1918) (it is well settled that public use questions are judicial); Hairston, Danville &
Western Railway Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908) (nature of property uses, whether public or
private, is ultimately a judicial question).
56. See Mt. Vernon, 240 U.S. at 32. The Court indicated that a legislature has a diffi-
cult task in deciding when to exercise its eminent domain power, and the Court will grant the
legislature wide latitude in public use determinations. Id. See also supra note 54.
57. 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
for the purpose of preserving the structures from destruction is justi-
fiable as a public use." The land in question was leased during the
First World War by the federal government for the purpose of con-
structing several military storage facilities. The lease required that
the government remove the structures within thirty days of the
lease's expiration. The government, however, exercised its condemna-
tion power to expropriate the land in order to avoid the removal. 9
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the taking, relying on
the language of the statute under which the War Department con-
demned the property. The statute provided that construction or pres-
ervation of military facilities is a public use for which private prop-
erty can be expropriated." Court approval of statutes authorizing
expropriation of private property for military purposes is not un-
usual. Defense of the country is one of the duties adhering to any
sovereign.61
Nevertheless, the Court's language concerning judicial review,
indicated a departure from prior cases in which the Court had called
for at least some scrutiny of legislative public use determinations."2
The Court concluded that a Congressional decision in this area "is
entitled to deference until it's shown to involve an impossibility.""3
Consequently, Congress was granted extremely broad discretion to
make public use determinations. The Court would exercise its duty
as interpreter of the Constitution 64 to review only the most extreme
cases.
65
2. United States v. Welch.-In United States v. Welch,66 the
Court completely abandoned judicial review of congressional public
use determinations. Welch addressed the question of whether the
Tennessee Valley Authority's 67 statutorily authorized condemnation
of private property merely for fiscal economy was justifiable as a
public use.0 8 The TVA had ordered construction of a reservoir. The
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 64.
61. "The war power is founded on necessity. It is exercised by the State and its author-
ized agents, not by individuals acting independently and upon their own authority." J. LEwis,
supra note 20 at 19. See also H. MILLS, supra note 23 at 5-6 (discusses the war power and the
State's rights and obligations when utilizing it).
62. See supra notes 28 and 55.
63. Old Dominion, 269 U.S. at 66.
64. See supra note 28.
65. Old Dominion, 269 U.S. at 66.
66. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
67. The Tennessee Valley Authority is a congressionally created public corporation es-
tablished for the purpose of improving economic and social conditions in the Tennessee valley
river basin. For an overview of the TVA and its purposes, see W. HOWARD, AUTHORITY IN
TVA LAND (1948).
68. Welch, 327 U.S. at 548.
project resulted in the flooding of the only access road to a small,
isolated community in North Carolina. 69 Construction of a new ac-
cess road to the area was not feasible for two reasons. First, the costs
were prohibitively high. Second, the United States was in the midst
of fighting the Second World War and, as a consequence, labor and
materials were not available for the construction. 70 The TVA opted
instead to provide for either the purchase or condemnation of all pri-
vate property in the isolated area in order to give the owners just
compensation for the effective loss of their property. 7' The Court af-
firmed TVA's condemnation efforts.7
The rationale underlying the Welch decision was clear: "We
think that it is the function of Congress to decide what type of tak-
ing is for a public use and that the agency authorized to do the tak-
ing may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority. ' 73 The
Court's language reveals a belief that shifting final responsibility for
public use determinations to Congress was necessary to prevent sub-
jective judicial interference in legislative decisions concerning the
proper function of government.
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The separate concurrences by Justices Reed 7 and Frankfurter
76
in the Welch decision are significant. Though both agreed with the
Court's judgment, both expressed concern over the apparent aban-
donment of the principle that determination of constitutional public
use questions is, ultimately, a judicial function. 77 Justice Reed stated
that whether a taking is "public" or not is a judicial question: "Of
course, the legislative or administrative determination has great
weight but the constitutional doctrine of Separation of Powers would
be unduly restricted if an administrative agency could invoke a so-
called political power to immunize its action against judicial exami-
nation in contests between the agency and the citizen."'78 This co-
gently worded description of the traditional separation of responsibil-
ity between Congress, or its statutorily designated agency, and the
Supreme Court in questions concerning the public use limitation
went unheeded by the majority of the Court.
79
69. Id.
70. Id. at 549.
71. Id. at 549-50.
72. Id. at 551.
73. Id. at 551-52.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 555 (Reed, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 557 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
77. Compare id. at 556 (Reed, J., concurring) (whether a taking is for a public purpose
is a judicial question) with id. at 558 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (question of whether a
taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond judicial competence).
78. Id. at 556 (Reed, J., concurring).
79. The Court has consistently broadened the power of a legislature to make public use
determinations in its public use decisions after Welch. See infra notes 104-108 and accompa-
3. Berman v. Parker.-Federal and state legislative authority
to exercise the eminent domain power greatly increased as a conse-
quence of the Supreme Court's decision in Berman v. Parker.80
Berman addressed the question of whether a legislature can use the
eminent domain power to condemn blighted property for the purpose
of expediting urban renewal projects.81 Congress had enacted legisla-
tion for the District of Columbia establishing an agency with the
authority to expropriate private property for approved urban redevel-
opment projects planned by private contractors. Under the agency's
procedures, title to the condemned property passed from its original
owner to the private developer. Pursuant to this statutory scheme,
the agency condemned property containing an operating store in an
area that was otherwise substantially blighted and abandoned in or-
der to facilitate the privately sponsored redevelopment of the area.82
The Court held that the condemnation was constitutionally
proper, reasoning that urban renewal schemes are public uses for
which a sovereign may exercise its eminent domain power to compel
transfer of private property from one owner to another.8 3 Three dis-
tinct reasons supported the Court's decision. First, the Court applied
the broad "public benefit" interpretation, believing that urban rede-
velopment projects further the general welfare. 84 Second, the Court
shifted the responsibility for making final decisions concerning the
nature of the public use limitation to Congress.85 The Court observed
that "Congress and its authorized agencies have made the determi-
nations [concerning public uses] that take into account a wide vari-
ety of values. It is not for us to reapprise them."' 86 Third, the Court
treated the eminent domain power as only an aspect or type of police
power,87 thus blurring the distinction between these two incidents of
nying text.
80. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
81. Id. at 28.
82. Id. at 28-31.
83. Id. at 36.
84. Id. at 32. The Court discussed the problems of urban blight:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease
and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the
people who live there to the status of cattle. The may indeed make living an
almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the com-
munity which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.
The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a
river.
Id.
85. Id. at 33.
86. Id. By implication, Berman extended this authority to state legislatures as well: "In
such cases [i.e., concerning public use questions] the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislat-
ing concerning local affairs." Id. at 32.
87. In Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851), the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts aptly defined the elusive "police power":
sovereignty."
The Court's confusion of the police and eminent domain powers
significantly extends legislative ability to use the eminent domain
power. The police power, the authority of a sovereign to act in order
to protect the public health, safety and welfare,89 is a more expan-
sive power than that of eminent domain. 90 No specific constitutional
limitations restrict the authority of a government to exercise its po-
lice power.91 By merging eminent domain into the police power,
Berman granted legislatures the ability to exercise the eminent do-
main power without regard for the constitutional public use limita-
tion. Pursuant to the police power, a legislature can enact any law it
deems necessary for the protection or furtherance of the public
welfare.
92
The combined effect of the Court's decisions in Old Dominion,
Welch, and Berman is the vesting of unfettered authority in both
Congress and the state legislatures over expropriation of private
property.9" The only remaining restriction on legislative authority to
exercise the eminent domain power is the constitutional requirement
that the land owner receive just compensation for the property
The power we allude to is the police power, the power vested in the legislature
by the Constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalty or without, not re-
pugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. It is much easier to per-
ceive and realize the existence and sources of power than to mark its boundaries,
or prescribe limits to its exercise. There are many cases in which such a power is
exercised by all well-ordered governments, and when its fitness is so obvious, that
all regulated minds regard it as reasonable.
In Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 325, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685,
689 (1981), the court noted that the police power "is the inherent reserved right of a state to
subject individual rights to reasonable regulations for the general welfare." See also Noble v.
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (the police power extends to all the "great public needs");
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (the police power is not subject to any
definite limitations, and is coextensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguard of the
public interest).
88. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
89. See supra note 87.
90. "Under the [police power], the public welfare is prompted by regulating and re-
stricting the use and enjoyment of property by the owner; under the [eminent domain power],
the public welfare is promoted by taking the property from the owner and expropriating it to
some particular use." J. LEWIS, supra note 20 at 17. See also Sackman, supra note 21 at 178-
79 (under the police power, the state does not generally appropriate property to another use,
but either destroys or damages it, while under the eminent domain power, property is trans-
ferred to the condemnor for positive use by its new owner).
91. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524, in which the Court noted that
the police power "is not subject to any definite limitations." Accord Netherton, Implementa-
tion of Land Use Policy: Eminent Domain v. Police Power, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33, 34-
38 (1968) (a sovereign may employ the police power without constitutional objection if the
measures enacted under its authority are reasonable and do not deprive individuals of due
process of law).
92. "Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through
the exercise of eminent domain is clear." Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
93. See supra notes 73 and 87-91 and accompanying text.
taken.9 The Court's recent holding in Midkiff vividly portrays the
consequences of these earlier decisions.
D. Consequences of the Court's Retreat From Judicial Review of
Legislative Public Use Determinations - Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,95 the Supreme Court
considered whether the compelled transfer of title in real property
from lessors to lessees is constitutional. The bulk of privately held
land in Hawaii had long been owned by a small class of individuals
who descended from Hawaii's ancient tribal chiefs and nobles.96
Most Hawaiians had access to land for use as farms or residences
only by virtue of long term leases with the few large landowners.9 7
The Hawaiian Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of
196798 to break up the large landed estates.9 9 By following certain
statutory procedures, lessees could petition a designated state agency
to condemn the land they had leased. 00 Ultimately, title passed from
the landlord to the lessee in exchange for the fair market value of
the property. 01 The lawmakers intended that this process achieve
two primary results. 02 First, they believed that creation of a land
market would stabilize the inflationary spiral of real estate prices. 03
Second, they believed that because individuals usually have more
pride in their community when they own, rather than lease their
94. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the validity of the constitutional just com-
pensation restriction in United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). See also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (the "right to exclude" is a fundamental
property interest that falls within the category of interests the Government cannot take with-
out just compensation).
95. 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984).
96. Prior to the passage of the Land Reform Act in 1967, land owners in Hawaii fell
largely into two groups. The state and federal governments owned 49% of the land, and a
small group of 72 individuals owned 47% of the land. Id. at 2325.
97. Id.
98. HAWAI REv. STAT. ch. 516 (1977).
99. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2325.
100. The Court described the operation of the statute:
Under the Act's condemnation scheme, tenants living on single-family resi-
dential lots within developmental tracts at least five acres in size are entitled to
ask the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which
they live. When 25 eligible tenants, or tenants on half the lots in the tract,
whichever is less, file appropriate applications, the Act authorizes HHA to hold
a public hearing to determine whether acquisition by the State of all or part of
the tract will effectuate the public purposes of the Act. If HHA finds that these
public purposes will be served, it is authorized to designate some or all of the lots
in the tract for acquisition.
Id. See also Conahan, Hawaii's Land Reform Act: Is it Constitutional?, 6 HAWAII B. J. 31,
32-34 (1969) (describes the procedural and substantive aspects of the Act).
101. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2325-26.
102. Id. at 2325.
103. Id.
residences, the redistribution scheme would have a stabilizing influ-
ence on society.
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The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hawai-
ian Land Reform Act under the public use clause of the fifth amend-
ment. Midkiff is significant because it clearly delineates the Court's
interpretation of the public use limitation as developed in earlier de-
cisions.105 The Court concluded that the power to expropriate prop-
erty for public use is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
police powers." 106 The impact of this logic on the public use limita-
tion is devastating. The equating of the eminent domain power with
the police power reduces the public use clause to mere surplusage,
leaving little more than legislative imagination to protect private
property from the whims of majoritarian politics.'07 The Court's re-
fusal to review a legislative scheme that boldly compels the transfer
of property from one private individual to another demonstrates the
breadth of a sovereign's authority in exercising the eminent domain
power."8
E. Summary of the Supreme Court's Present Views on the Emi-
nent Domain Power
The Supreme Court's present interpretation of the public use
clause fails to protect the individual's right to secure ownership of
property. 109 Because the Court refuses to review legislative public
use determinations, legislatures have absolute discretion to pursue
the kind of social engineering the Hawaiian legislature attempted
through the Land Reform Act of 1967.1° Although the Court still
adheres to the principle that a condemnor must pay just compensa-
tion to the condemnee,"' the authority to expropriate private prop-
104. Id.
105. The Court in Midkiff relied heavily upon the reasoning of earlier decisions concern-
ing the public use limitation. Quoting extensively from the Berman decision, the Court in
Midkiff explained the meaning of the language in earlier decisions. Id. at 2328-29.
106. Id. at 2329.
107. "Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are substantial reasons for
an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination that the taking will
serve a public use." Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. at 2331.
108. The Court held that the expropriating government does not even have to take pos-
session of the property:
The Act advances its purposes without the State taking actual possession of the land. In
such cases, government does not itself have to use property to legitimate the taking, it is only
the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use
Clause.
Id. See also Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation On The Power of Eminent Domain: A
Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REv. 231 (1984) (analyzes the potential ef-
fects of a recent state court decision granting a state broad discretion in exercising the eminent
domain power to effectuate transfer of property between private individuals).
109. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 88 & 101.
Il1. See supra note 94.
erty is limited only by the sovereign's pocketbook.
IV. Analysis
A. Overview
The Supreme Court's present interpretation of the term "public
use" is inconsistent in three respects with the views and intentions of
the founding fathers. First, the failure to protect private property
rights diverges sharply from the founding fathers' high regard for
property rights.112 Second, the Court has upset a carefully con-
structed constitutional balance between the power of government
and the rights of individuals regarding the use of private property.'1 3
Third, the Court has undercut a basic principle of constitutional gov-
ernment: that minority rights cannot fall prey to the desires of the
majority.
1 4
B. The Founding Fathers and the Right to Property
During the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth cen-
tury, many legal theorists posited that the right to own and acquire
property flowed directly from a higher natural law preeminent over
the authority of earthly sovereigns." 3 Americans considered their
right to own property as fundamental to the enjoyment and preserva-
tion of their liberty."' Indeed, men with views as divergent as John
Adams" 7 and Thomas Jefferson" 8 equated the right to liberty with
112. See infra notes 135-62 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 163-85 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 186-209 and accompanying text.
115. The importance of property rights was stressed in I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *138-40:
The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property which
consists in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions, without
any control or dimunition, save only by the laws of the land. The origin of pri-
vate property is probably found in nature ...So great moreover is the regard
for the law of private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it,
not even for the general good of the community.
See also Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) (the right of
acquiring and owning property, and having it protected is one of the natural, inherent and
unalienable rights of man); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2-14 (traces the natural law
origins and growth of man's property rights); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES *661 (the protections
the Constitution affords to private property derive from natural law); 2 J. WILSON, WILSON'S
WORKS *309-10 (individuals have a natural right to property).
116. "In no country in the world is the love of property more active and anxious than in
the United States; nowhere does the majority display less inclination for those principles which
threaten to alter, in whatever manner, the law of property." 2 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 270 (H. Reeve trans. 1945). See also C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA:
THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 71 (1966) (to the men of the eighteenth
century, property gave a person a stake in society, made him responsible, worthy of a voice in
government) [hereinafter cited as C. BOWEN].
117. Adams stated that "property is a right of mankind as surely as liberty." C. BOWEN,
supra note 116 at 71.
118. Jefferson noted that "It]he true foundation of republican government is the equal
the right to property. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federal-
ist" 9 that a strong executive branch is necessary for the protection of
private property rights.120 Many other drafters of the Constitution
expressed similar beliefs. 21
Moreover, the infringements of the British crown against the
property rights of American colonists is considered a root cause of
the American Revolution. 22 Britain's continual use of the taxing
power to impose its will on the American colonies and to deprive the
colonists of their property, provided the initial irritant that sparked
the revolt.123 Many of the revolutionary groups calling for indepen-
right of every citizen in his person and in his property." Id. Thomas Paine also spoke of the
importance of the property right: "The end of all political associations is the preservation of
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man, and these rights are liberty, property, security
and the resistance of oppression." C. ANTIEAU, RIGHTS OF OUR FATHERS 126 (1968) [herein-
after cited C. ANTIEAU].
119. THE FEDERALIST is a series of papers written by Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison and John Jay supporting acceptance of the Constitution. For a discussion of the his-
tory and impact of THE FEDERALIST see I W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 8-
11 (1953).
120. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961): "En-
ergy in the executive is a leading characteristic in the definition of good government. It is
essential . . . to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combina-
tions which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice .... " See also THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 85 at 521 (A. Hamilton) (additional securities to republican government, liberty and
property will be derived from the adoption of the Constitution).
121. Gouverneur Morris, one of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention, stated in
debate that "men don't unite for liberty or life ... they unite for the protection of property."
C. BOWEN, supra note 136 at 140. The constitutional convention was undoubtedly property
oriented:
The liberties that the constitutionalists hoped to gain were chiefly negative ....
They aimed to create a government that would act as an honest broker among a
variety of propertied interests, giving them all protection from their common
enemies and preventing any one of them from becoming too powerful. The Con-
vention was a fraternity of types of absentee ownership. All property should be
permitted to have its proportionate voice in government. Individual property in-
terests might have to be sacrificed at times, but only for the community of prop-
erty interests. Freedom for property would result in liberty for men - perhaps
not all men, but at least for all worthy men. Because men have different facul-
ties and abilities, the fathers believed, they acquire different amounts of prop-
erty. To protect property is only to protect men in the exercise of their natural
faculties. Among the many liberties, therefore, the freedom to hold and dispose
of property is paramount. Democracy, unchecked rule by the masses, is sure to
bring arbitrary redistribution of property, destroying the very essence of liberty.
R. Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, 12-21 (1948).
Cf. Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 409, 412 n. 16 (1983) (Constitutional Convention gave serious consideration to instituting
a political representation scheme based on property holdings).
122. Stephen Hopkins, arguing in 1764 against the proposed Stamp Act, stated that
"they who have no property can have no freedom." C. BOWEN, supra note 116 at 71. During
the same year, James Otis, in THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED,
stated that "Itihe supreme power cannot take away from any man any part of his property,
without his consent in person or by representation." B. WRIGHT, A SOURCE BOOK OF AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL THEORY 48-49 (1929).
123. The first slogan of the American colonists favoring independence from England was
"Liberty, Property and No Stamps!" C. BOWEN, supra note 116 at 70.
For an overview of the events and circumstances surrounding Britain's imposition of taxes
on the American colonies, see generally B. LOSSING, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 207-
dence from Great Britain proclaimed the need to preserve the rights
to life, liberty and property. 24 The most important and influential of
these revolutionary proclamations concerning the significance of the
right to property is found in the Declaration of Independence. The
Declaration states that "all men . . . are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable rights, that among them are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness."' 25 The words "pursuit of Happiness"
are often construed to mean the right to acquire, own and use prop-
erty. 2 6 Two points support this construction. First, the Continental
Congress in its "Declaration and Resolves to the English King," a
direct forerunner of the Declaration of Independence, stated that the
colonists were entitled to "life, liberty, and property.' 27 Second, and
more important, Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration's primary au-
thor, along with many of his Revolutionary contemporaries, was
heavily influenced by English philosopher John Locke's writings on
the purpose of government.'28 A basic premise of Locke's writings is
that protection of the individual's rights, particularly life, liberty and
29 (1872). See also J. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 80-106, 212-16
(1943) (discussion of British and American reactions to Parliament's imposition of taxes on
the colonies).
124. In August 1774 the Boston Committee of Correspondence declared, "We are enti-
tled to life, liberty and the means of sustenance." E. DUMBAULD. THE DECLARATION OF INDE-
PENDENCE 60 (1950) [hereinafter cited as E. DUMBAULD, DECLARATION]. In 1773, the Massa-
chusetts council wrote that "[Ilife, liberty, property, and the disposal of that property, with our
own consent, are natural rights." Id. The Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768 stated that it
is "an essential, unalterable Right, in nature ...ever held sacred and irrevocable ...that
what a man has honestly acquired is absolutely his own." C. BOWEN, supra note 116 at 71.
125. The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776).
126. See infra notes 127 and 128 and accompanying text.
127. C. BOWEN, supra note 116 at 71. The Declaration also bears a striking similarity to
certain sections of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was written in 1774. The underly-
ing theory of Virginia's Declaration is epitomized in the following excerpt:
All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain rights, of
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact,
deprive their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means
of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.
VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1774), quoted in G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEF-
FERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 240 (1979).
128. See C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 27 (noting textual similari-
ties between the Declaration and Locke's Second Treatise on Government); B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-28 (1967) (during the period im-
mediately prior to the American Revolution, many American writers cited Locke's writings on
natural rights and social contract); C. FRIEDRICH & R. MCCLOSKEY, FROM THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION 10-12 (1954) (Jefferson's 'pursuit of happiness' and
Locke's 'property' are similar in meaning because in Locke's view, the protection and preserva-
tion of property is essential to preserve self-preservation and happiness); Perry, The Declara-
tion of Independence in THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 81-82
(E. Latham ed. 1949) (Locke's role as the greatest exponent of enlightenment thought is the
reason for his significant impact on the thinking of the founding fathers); C. ROSSITER, SEED-
TIME OF THE REPUBLIC 379-80 (1953) ("If Locke included liberty in his definition of property,
colonists included property in their definition of liberty."). For a discussion of the origins of the
phrase "pursuit of happiness," see Ganter, Jefferson's "Pursuit of Happiness" and Some For-
gotten Men, 16 WM. & MARY Q. (2nd Series) 422, 422-34, 558-85 (1936).
property, is the very reason societies establish governments.129 Jeffer-
son's change in terminology from "property" to "happiness" could
reflect a belief on the part of the Continental Congress that the free-
dom to acquire wealth and property is a necessary prerequisite for
happiness.130 Indeed, the revolutionary generation believed this right
important enough to defend in a desperate and costly war.1' 1
After gaining their independence from Great Britain, the thir-
teen American states initially adopted the Articles of Confederation
as the framework of their national government. 13 2 Within a few
years, however, the Articles fell into disfavor for a variety of rea-
sons."'3 Discontentment with the operation of the Articles led to the
Philadelphia Convention in 1787, which convened to draft a new
blue print for national government. 34
129. In addressing the importance of man's property rights, Locke stated:
The Supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without
his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government,
and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires
that the people should have property without which they must be supposed to
lose that by entering into society which was the end for which they entered into
it, too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men, therefore, in society having
property, they have a right to such goods, which by the law of community are
theirs, that nobody have a right to take them, or any part of them, from them
without their consent, without this they have no property at all.
J. LOCKE. OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 187-88 (Everyman Library ed. 1924). See also J. LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960). In discussing the reasons why
men form governments, Locke noted:
The only way whereby anyone divests himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts
on the bands of Civil Society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into
a Community, for their comfortable, safe and peaceable living amongst one an-
other, in a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against
any that are not of it.
Id. at 374-75.
130. See A.J. BEITZINGER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 164 (1972):
The general natural rights specifically mentioned in the Declaration were life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-a modification of the Lockean triad-life,
liberty, and property. This change was not as significant as is sometimes be-
lieved. It did not mean that property was not considered a natural right; on the
contrary, property was all but universally regarded as a necessary instrument to
the realization of the three rights named.
Cf. E. DUMBAULD. DECLARATION, supra note 124 at 60-61. Dumbauld speculates that Jeffer-
son's change in terminology was due to his belief that the right to property derives only from
the state, and Jefferson intended the Declaration to contain only rights deriving from natural
law. Id.
131. See C. BOWEN, supra note 116 at 70 (notes men had died to protect property rights
in the American Revolution).
132. For a discussion concerning the operation of the American government under the
Articles of Confederation, see C. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION 24-29 (1926).
133. See generally A. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 137-47 (1935) (analyzes the problems and discontent arising from the operation of the
Articles of Confederation) [hereinafter cited as A. MCLAUGHLIN].
134. C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928) provides a history of the
events leading to the convening of the Constitutional Convention. The author also describes the
many controversies that arose during the drafting of the Constitution [hereinafter cited as C.
WARREN].
The Constitution as originally drafted did not contain an enu-
meration of the fundamental rights held by individuals against the
government. Many members of the Convention believed that a spe-
cific enumeration would be interpreted as an abandonment of any
rights not so enumerated. 135 But when the Constitution was submit-
ted to the states for ratification, many critics expressed concern over
the drafters' failure to provide some guarantee of individual
rights,186 including the right to property. 13 7 In order to ensure ratifi-
cation, some of the drafters promised to amend the document with a
Bill of Rights.138 Congress fulfilled this promise in 1789.139
135. Many members of the Convention were extremely apprehensive about including a
Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Their fears were expressed by Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST
No. 84 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961):
I. go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in
which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitu-
tion but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to
powers which are not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colora-
ble pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall
not be done for which there is no power to do?
Id. at 513.
136. Many individuals opposed to the ratification of the Constitution expressed the fear
that granting powers to a central, national government without imposing concomitant limita-
tions on those powers would result in a government with the ability to act at will against the
rights of its citizens. One opponent of the Constitution noted:
The powers, rights, and authority, granted to the general government by this
constitution, are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend,
as that of any state government. It reaches to every thing which concerns human
happiness-Life, liberty, and property are under its controul. There is the same
reason, therefore, that the exercise of power, in this case, should be restrained
within proper limits, as in that of the state governments.
Brutus, Essays of Brutus in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 374 (H. Storing ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as ANTI-FEDERALIST].
The objections posed by Brutus and others concerning the Constitution's failure to protect
individual rights resulted in the efforts of the First Congress to add provisions to the Constitu-
tion for the protection of individual rights. See A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 133 at 211; H.
HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1826 224-25 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as H. HOCKETTI.
137. A number of opponents to ratification of the Constitution expressed concern over
the document's failure to protect property rights. These fears were best expressed by the writer
known as the "Republican Federalist":
Of all compacts, a Constitution or frame of government, is the most solemn and
important, and should be strictly adhered to. The object of it is the preservation
of that property, which every individual of the community has, in his life, lib-
erty, and estate. Every measure, therefore, that only approaches to an infraction
of such a covenant, ought to be avoided, because it will injure that sacred regard
to the Constitution which should be deeply impressed on the minds of the whole
community-How much more careful then should we be to avoid an open viola-
tion of such a compact?
4 ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 136 at 172.
138. See C. WARREN, supra note 134 at 510 (assurances by Constitution's drafters to
remedy omission of a Bill of Rights enabled the Constitution's ratification by a sufficient num-
ber of states).
139. After a long debate, Congress finally approved 12 amendments to the Constitution
and proposed them to the states for ratification. Of these, 10 met with the approval of the state
ratifying conventions and became the Bill of Rights.
C. Contrast Between Views of the Founders and of the Modern
Supreme Court
The right to own property was proudly proclaimed and dearly
defended by the nation's founders. The present Court, however,
deemphasizes and deflates the importance of what the founders con-
sidered inalienable and unquestionable. 40 The Court subjects prop-
erty rights to the whimsy of the majoritarian political process.14'
Under the Founders' view, ownership of property was a natural right
of man, which government could not deprive or constrict without the
property owner's consent. 1 2 Under the modern Court's view, prop-
erty can be stripped from its owner merely because the legislature
decides that expropriation is necessary for the benefit of the general
welfare.
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D. The Balance Intended by the Constitution's Drafters
The fifth amendment, which was added to the Constitution by
the Bill of Rights, protects private property rights against the sover-
140. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text. But see Lynch v. Household Fi-
nance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). In this recent decision, the Court, in dicta, noted the im-
portance of property rights:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak, or the right to
travel, is in truth a personal right, whether the property in question is a welfare
check, home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental inter-dependence ex-
ists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right to property.
Neither could have meaning without the other.
Id. at 552.
141. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
143. The continued vitality of the public use limitation on the eminent domain power
has also been severely circumscribed in two recent state decisions. In Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981), the court upheld the
validity of a statute that allowed the City of Detroit to condemn private residential property
and then transfer it to General Motors to facilitate construction of a new manufacturing facil-
ity. Although an entire residential neighborhood was condemned to provide the space neces-
sary, the court held that the condemnation was justified by the public benefits flowing to the
entire Detroit community: "The power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance pri-
marily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revital-
izing the economic base of the community. The benefit to a private interest is merely inciden-
tal." Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 455.
The public use limitation was also undercut in City v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60,
183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d 835 (1982), which involved an eminent domain action by the
City of Oakland to acquire ownership of the Oakland Raiders football team. The action was a
response to attempts by the team owner to relocate the club in another city. The California
Supreme Court overturned the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the team,
reasoning that public use determinations often depend largely on the facts and circumstances
of the particular case in question. Some of the court's language indicates an extremely expan-
sive view of what constitutes a public use: "[W]e conclude only that the acquisition and, in-
deed, the operation of a franchise may be an appropriate municipal function. If such valid
public use can be demonstrated, the statutes discussed herein afforded City the power to ac-
quire by eminent domain any property necessary to accomplish that use." Id. at 72, 183 Cal.
Rptr. at 681, 646 P.2d at 843.
eign's eminent domain power.""' The amendment establishes a bal-
ance between government and the individual regarding the use of
property. 1 5 The drafters of the Constitution realized that govern-
ment needs the authority to exercise certain powers to ensure its sur-
vival. 40 One of these necessary and natural powers is the authority
to expropriate private property.4 The members of the Convention
also expressed a strong belief in the individual's right to own prop-
erty. 48 In order to balance this sharp clash of interests, the drafters
of the Bill of Rights recognized government's inherent power to ex-
propriate private property, but limited this power by placing certain
restrictions on its exercise. Thus, a condemning authority must in-
tend to expropriate for a public use, and the property's owner must
receive fair compensation for his loss. 1 9
E. The Supreme Court's Destruction of the Constitutional Balance
The Supreme Court's public use decisions have tipped the origi-
nally-intended balance between private property owners and govern-
ment. By refusing to exercise its duty as ultimate interpreter of the
144. See supra notes 1-6, and accompanying text.
145. James Madison drafted the private property clause of the fifth amendment.
Stoebuck, supra note 24 at 595. An analysis of his writings about the nature of government
reveal his desire to establish a balance between the power of government and the rights of
individuals in property matters. Concerning his regard for the protection of property, note his
statement in THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 339 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961): "Govern-
ment is instituted no less for the protection of property, than of the person of individuals." But
he was also aware that a government needs to have sufficient power to function effectively. In
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 & 46 at 288-300, Madison stated that the proposed Constitution
would enable the federal government to exercise more fully and effectively the powers neces-
sary for its continued existence. Drawing examples from both the history of ancient republics
and the American experience under the Articles of Confederation, Madison concluded that a
government lacking the authority to maintain and defend itself will eventually fall prey to
either internal or external pressures. He believed, however, that the proposed Constitution
would allow the federal government to survive both internal dissent and external attack by
foreign enemies. Thus, in light of Madison's concern for both private property rights and a
strong national government, the eminent domain portion of the fifth amendment should be
construed as an attempt to balance potential conflicts between the individual property owner
and the government. See also Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,
641-43 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (free government demands that constitutional limits be
placed on the extensive "prerogatives and attributes of sovereignty," such as eminent domain).
146. The Articles of Confederation were discarded because they failed to provide the
national government with enough authority to properly function as a sovereign. A. MCLAUGH-
LIN, supra note 133 at 137-38.
147. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 121.
149. See supra notes 2 and 28. Cf. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897):
The requirement that the property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation is but an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the common
law for the protection of private property. It is founded in natural equity, and is
laid down by jurists as a principle of universal law. Indeed, in a free government
almost all other rights would become worthless if the government possessed an
uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every citizen.
Constitution,' 60 the Supreme Court has significantly diminished the
fifth amendment's protection of private property interests. The pub-
lic use and just compensation clauses are constitutional barriers
against an otherwise unlimited power, and the Supreme Court is em-
powered to define the extent of these barriers by reviewing the legiti-
macy of legislative public use determinations.1 " The Court's re-
peated failure to exercise the reviewing power, 152 upon which the
constitutional balance depends, vitiates the public use limitation as a
restriction on the eminent domain power. No effective constraint re-
mains on the legislature's ability to designate as "public" any use of
property.
F. Protection of Minority Rights from Majoritarian Excesses
A basic reason for enumerating the rights held by individuals
against government is the protection of unpopular minority groups
from the kind of majoritarian excesses common to popular govern-
ments. 1 3 The rights and interests of the majority are protected by
the legislature because popularly-elected legislators usually respect
the majoritarian will. On the other hand, minority rights, especially
when in conflict with the interests of the majority, need special pro-
tection." 4 Legislatures do not usually face political pressure to safe-
150. See supra note 28.
151. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 73 and 96.
153. The rationale underlying the constitutional protection of minority rights is stated
eloquently in a letter written by James Iredell:
The pleasure of a majority of the Assembly! God forbid! How many things have
been done by majorities of a large body in heat and passion that they themselves
afterwards repented of? Besides, would the minority choose to put themselves in
the power of a majority? None, therefore, could even have a chance of being
secured, but sycophants that will forever sacrifice reason, conscience and duty to
the preservation of a temporary popular favor. Will this not put an end to all
freedom of deliberation, to all manly spirit, and prove the utter extinction of all
real liberty . . . . In a republican government (as I conceive) individual liberty
is a matter of the utmost moment, as, if there be no check upon the public
passions, it is in the greatest danger. The majority, having the rule in their own
hands, may take care of themselves, but in what condition are the minority, if
the power of the other is without limit? These considerations, I suppose, or simi-
lar ones, occasioned such express provisions for the personal liberty of each citi-
zen, which the citizens, when they formed the Constitution, chose to reserve as
an unalienated right, and not to leave at the mercy of any assembly whatever.
The restriction might be attended with inconvenience; but they chose to risk the
inconvenience, for the sake of the advantage.
Letter by James Iredell, reprinted in C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 214 (2d ed. 1932) [hereinafter cited as C. HAINES]. See also Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Constitution protects individual
liberties against the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities); Loan Association v. Topeka,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1874) (when government does not recognize the rights of indi-
viduals, a despotism of the majority is created).
154. The minority's need of special protection against the united interests of the major-
ity was noted in THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 233 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961): "if a
majority be united by common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure."
guard minority rights. For this reason, the Constitution contains a
list of inviolable rights held by every person, whether in the political
majority or minority.1 55 Government cannot infringe upon these
rights. 50 Furthermore, courts are the constitutionally empowered fo-
rums to which individuals can turn for redress if their government
does trespass on protected ground. 57
In its decisions concerning the public use clause, the Supreme
Court has not performed its constitutional duty to ensure protection
of the minority rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 158 The ramifi-
cations of the Court's failure substantiate fears expressed two hun-
dred years ago by James Madison,'159 the principal author of the Bill
of Rights.
In effect, the Court has abandoned the constitutional public use
protection. By allowing legislative public use determinations to stand
without judicial scrutiny, °60 the Court has sacrificed the property
rights of private landowners to the majority will. Property is, after
all, usually expropriated from only a few individuals at a time. The
affected property owners can raise only a small dissenting voice in a
legislative chamber. In the past, however, the courts compensated for
this lack of representation by providing the displaced property owner
with a forum to challenge the expropriation on the ground that the
intended use of the property was not truly public in nature.' 6'
The Supreme Court has eliminated the ability of property own-
ers to challenge a taking on public use grounds by holding that it
will not review legislative public use determinations. Legislatures
now have the final authority to make these decisions.'62 The victim-
ized property owner, an insignificant minority to which legislatures
would most likely turn a deaf ear, has no viable recourse to prevent
the taking of his property as long as the condemning authority is
155. See C. HAINES, supra note 153 at 213 (protection of minorities against the dangers
of majority rule was one of the purposes that the drafters of the Bill of Rights intended to
accomplish). See also supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
156. The constitutional rights held by an individual are considered protections against
the authority of government. See supra notes 135 and 136.
157. See supra note 28.
158. Cf. C. HAINES, supra note 153 at 215-16 (the founders believed the judiciary would
become the greatest bulwark for the protection of individual interests because it would secure
the rights of the minority).
159. See infra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
160. By permitting legislatures to have absolute discretion in public use questions, the
Court ignores the warning it gave in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951):
"Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of man's
other inventions."
161. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chertkof, 293 Md. 32, 43, 441 A.2d
1044, 1051 (1982): "Whether the use for which private property is taken is public or private is
a judicial question, to be determined by the court; a legislative body cannot make a particular
use either public or private by merely declaring it so." See also supra note 55.
162. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
willing to remunerate him for his loss.
Unfettered legislative discretion in the exercise of the eminent
domain power gives rise to dangers long associated with popular
forms of government. In The Federalist,'3 James Madison advo-
cated a strong constitution to prevent the abrogation of minority
rights by an impassioned majority.'1 4 In Madison's view, the right to
property was one of the minority interests in particular need of pro-
tection. Property owners could be threatened with loss of their hold-
ings by a landless majority16 acting through the legislature.16 Only
specific constitutional protections, such as the Madison-authored
public use and just compensation clauses of the fifth amendment,
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could provide the needed constraints on the power of wanton legisla-
tive majorities to expropriate private property.
Today, in the wake of Midkiff and its predecessors, a desire on
the part of a political majority to seize the property of a landed mi-
nority can become reality. The Supreme Court has given legisla-
tures, usually instruments of the majority, practically unlimited au-
thority to exercise the eminent domain power to expropriate private
property.0 8 The government can take property for any purpose a
163. Madison expressed his fears in a number of his works, especially in THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 10 at 77-84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The following discussion will draw
upon various works of Madison.
164. In THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 324 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), Madison
discussed his apprehensions concerning majority tyranny, and proposed a plan to obviate ma-
jority tyranny:
Whilst all authority in [the federal republic] will be derived from and dependent
on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in
little danger from interested combinations of the majority.
165. In THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 79 (J. Madison), Madison noted that "the most
common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of prop-
erty. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in
society." Arguing the virtues of federal union over state autonomy later in the same paper,
Madison observed that "[a] rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to invade the
whole body of the Union than a particular member of it. ... Id. at 84.
166. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829) describes the threat that the
actions of an unrestrained legislature present to personal and property rights:
[G]overnment can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property
are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any re-
straint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the
rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no
court of justice in this country would be warranted in assuming, that the power
to violate and disregard them; a power so repugnant to the common principles of
justice and civil liberty, lurked under any general grant of legislative authority,
or ought to be implied from any general expressions of the will of the people.
The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security
and well-being, without very strong and direct expressions of such an intention.
167. See supra note 145.
168. The Supreme Court's decisions granting legislatures absolute discretion in public
use determinations ominously extend to legislatures the type of authority espoused by Thomas
Hobbes. Hobbes believed that a sovereign, whether one man or an assembly of men, has abso-
lute authority over its citizens:
legislature deems "public" in nature. A discontented majority could
very conceivably pressure lawmakers into enacting a land redistribu-
tion scheme merely for the transfer of property from the haves to the
have nots.' 69
The Midkiff decision is an excellent example of the kind of
majoritarian excesses Madison and his contemporaries feared. 170 The
Hawaiian legislature designed a land redistribution scheme primarily
to compel transfer of private property from a few large landowners
to many propertyless lessees. 171 The statute does not establish any
requirements for the new owners' use of the expropriated land.
7
1
The new owners may either sell, lease, or keep the property.
Thus, the Hawaiian legislature merely provided for the strip-
ping of private property from its owner for transfer to another
through a forced sale. The legislature designated this activity a
"public use" on the theory that a broader distribution of private
property would enhance the welfare of Hawaiian citizens.17 3  By
meekly acquiescing in the Hawaiian legislature's judgment, the Su-
preme Court has demonstrated its unwillingness to protect private
property rights through review of legislative public use determina-
tions, even when a legislature enacts a law providing for the redistri-
bution of property among private persons.
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The Legislator in all Commonwealths, is only the Sovereign, be he one Man, as
in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy, or Aristocracy...
the Sovereign is the sole Legislator . . . .None can abrogate a Law made, but
the Sovereign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by another Law, that forbid-
deth it to be put in execution.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 312-13 (C. B. MacPherson ed. 1968). Legislatures confronting public
use questions now have the authority of Hobbes' Sovereign. Legislative decisions to expropriate
private property cannot be challenged by affected landowners. The Supreme Court has effec-
tively abrogated judicial review of legislative public use determinations. The constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances between the branches of government is seriously jeopardized by
the court's present division of responsibility, or lack thereof, for public use determinations.
169. The disregard for a person's right to his property exhibited by the Supreme Court
in its recent public use decisions ignores the maxim set forth in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 388 (1798): "A law that takes property from A and gives it to B ... is against all reason
and justice."
170. Madison expressed his fear of majoritarian tyranny over minority rights in contexts
other than THE FEDERALIST. In a 1788 letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison noted:
Wherever the real power in government, there is the danger of oppression. In our
governments, the real power lies in a majority of the Community, and the inva-
sion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government
is the mere instrument of the major number of Constituents.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 271-72 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
171. See supra note 100.
172. See HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 516 (1977).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 102-104.
174. The impotence of the public use limitation under the Court's interpretation is fur-
ther emphasized in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984), which was announced
shortly after Midkiff. The issues in that case centered on data consideration and gathering
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodentcide Act, which governs registra-
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has abandoned its duty to enforce the con-
stitutional public use limitation on the eminent domain power. Two
related effects flow from the Court's current interpretation of the
fifth amendment. First, legislatures now have the sole responsibility
for making determinations concerning what types of property uses
are "public" in nature. The Court refuses to review these determina-
tions. Consequently, no effective restraint remains on a legislature's
ability to expropriate private property. Second, the right to own
property, which was so highly esteemed by the founding fathers, is
no longer afforded the full measure of constitutional protection. No
longer a right derived from a higher natural law, private ownership
of property has been reduced to a mere privilege held subject to the
positivist will of a sovereign.
James Janda
tion of pesticides with the Environmental Protection Agency. The Act provides that all appli-
cants desiring to register a pesticide with the agency must file certain information regarding
the product. The Act permits the EPA to use and to release to later applicants the information
thus filed. Monsanto, who registered its pesticides with the EPA, brought suit seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief from the Act's disclosure provisions on the theory that these provi-
sions effected a taking in violation of the fifth amendment.
The Court considered whether any possible takings under the Act conformed to the public
use requirement. Quoting Midkiff, the Court again noted that the eminent domain authority
under the fifth amendment is coextensive with the police power. Id. at 2879. The Court held
that "[the role of the courts in second-guessing the legislature's judgment of what constitutes
a public use is extremely narrow . . . .So long as the taking has a conceivable public charac-
ter, the means by which it will be attained is . . .for Congress to determine." Id. Thus, the
Court concluded that the disclosure provisions of the Act are public in nature on the ground
that Congress intended to eliminate costly duplication of research and to streamline the regis-
tration process, which, in turn, would increase the availability of products for consumers. Al-
though the scheme effects a transfer of property interests from one private individual to an-
other, the Court, as in Midkiff, simply stated that the Act's purpose is within the scope of the
police power. Id. at 2879-80.

